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Uninformed partisans? The redistributive preferences of young Greeks 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper adds to the literature on subjective redistributive preferences. Ιt aims at 
explaining the preferences of young people, a theme which has, paradoxically, been 
underresearched. The paper explores specific preferences over a range of redistributive 
policies and labour market institutions. A two-stage research strategy is employed to trace 
the impact of information, as well as the influence of self-interest, personal economic 
prospects, ideology, and political attitudes on redistributive preferences in a sample of 533 
students. The provision of information – that is, lifting the porous veil of ignorance facing 
young persons – has virtually no effect on preferences. Two mechanisms are uncovered: an 
ideological-political and a political-economic one. The latter explains the intensity of 
redistributive preferences, but not their content and direction. 
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Απληροφόρητοι και μεροληπτικοί; Οι αναδιανεμητικές προτιμήσεις των νέων Ελλήνων 
 
ΠΕΡΙΛΗΨΗ 
Το παρόν άρθρο αποσκοπεί στην εξήγηση των (υποκειμενικών) αναδιανεμητικών προτιμήσεων 
των νέων, μιας ομάδας της οποίας οι προτιμήσεις δεν έχουν τύχει μεγάλης προσοχής, 
παραδόξως. Διερευνώνται οι προτιμήσεις έναντι ευθέως αναδιανεμητικών πολιτικών και 
θεσμών της αγοράς εργασίας. Εφαρμόζεται μια ερευνητική στρατηγική δύο σταδίων, με σκοπό 
να εντοπιστεί η επίδραση της πληροφόρησης και των προσωπικών οικονομικών προοπτικών, 
της ιδεολογίας και των πολιτικών στάσεων, σε δείγμα 533 φοιτητών. Η πληροφόρηση, δηλαδή 
η άρση, εν προκειμένω, του διαφανούς πέπλου άγνοιας των φοιτητών, δεν επηρεάζει τις 
προτιμήσεις τους. Οι τελευταίες διαμορφώνονται μέσω δύο μηχανισμών: του 
ιδεολογικοπολιτικού και του πολιτικοοικονομικού. Ο δεύτερος επηρεάζει την ένταση και όχι το 
περιεχόμενο των προτιμήσεων. 
 
Λέξεις-κλειδιά: Οικονομική κοινωνιολογία, αναδιανεμητικές προτιμήσεις, λανθάνουσες 
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Theoretical and empirical research about preferences for redistribution has been growing 
during the last decade, if not earlier; it has even taken a boost alongside a surge in the 
literature on economic inequalities and redistribution, following the publication of Thomas 
Piketty’s authoritative work (Piketty, 2014). Research inquiry has mostly focused on the 
relative importance of the self-interested utility maximization motive and ideological beliefs 
in shaping redistributive preferences.  
Support for redistribution, or lack thereof, has been studied at the individual level, but 
explanations have also been sought at the level of the social, labour market, and demographic 
groups as well as the national level. However, what is striking is the absence of almost any 
attempt at analyzing the preferences of young persons, particularly those in tertiary education 
and/or about to enter the labour market for the first time, at least in a formal way. Yet, such 
persons experience the impact of redistributive policies on their own lives and personal well-
being, including on their future employment and income opportunities. And they are subject 
to the impact of redistributive policies partly as members of their parental families and 
concerning their parents’ tax liabilities and benefit entitlements. Besides, such persons have 
full voting rights. 
Empirical research has mostly relied on social surveys providing information on 
subjective preferences for redistribution. Subjective redistributive preferences are regularly 
formed based on perceptions regarding the distribution of income and the agent’s position in 
the corresponding income ladder, but they also reflect the survey respondents’ social values 
and political beliefs. Nevertheless, survey evidence fails to account for the likely sensitivity 
of subjective preferences to sudden changes in perceptions, mostly associated with (variously 
activated) increases in the availability, or, merely the visibility and accessibility of 
information regarding, for example, the evolution of wealth and income inequalities and the 
effectiveness of policy responses. On the other hand, research has often taken the form of 
laboratory experiments aiming, inter alia, at identifying normative beliefs about fairness, 
equality, and redistribution, albeit in an artificial world.  
However, more often than not, the analysis of individual redistributive preferences 
has been confined to overall redistribution, having little regard for the range of specific 
policies and institutions which mitigate (market, pre-tax) earnings inequality and redistribute 
disposable income, including taxation, labour market policies, social protection, and 
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provision of social goods and services. Yet, there is substantial divergence across 
redistributive policy and (welfare state) institutions, both concerning their redistributive 
effects and because of their implications for economic efficiency. Furthermore, social 
redistributive policies are often targeted, or, are effectively skewed in favour of certain social 
groups. Thus, an individual may disapprove of a particular policy but support enthusiastically 
another, irrespective of her preferences for redistribution overall.  
This paper focuses on the redistributive preferences of young Greeks, in particular 
university students. In the next section, we review the related literature and present our 
hypotheses and then, in Section 3, we describe our experimental design and discuss the 
conceptual issues involved.  In Section 4, we present our findings and discuss their meaning 
and their implications for future research. The last section concludes.   
 
2. A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE – AND THE HYPOTHESES TO BE TESTED 
What drives demand for redistribution? Are individual preferences largely motivated by self-
interest, thereby reflecting individual income and capital resources? Do social values and 
political ideology weigh in on the formation of individual redistributive preferences? The 
self-interest explanation implies that those expecting to benefit from income redistribution, 
i.e. those whose income falls below the mean income, will most likely be in favour of 
government redistributive policies, whereas those expecting to find themselves on the side of 
net contributors, i.e. those with incomes above the mean income, will in all likelihood oppose 
redistribution. Furthermore, as long as spending on social policies is looked at in 
redistributive terms, those expecting to benefit (lose) from increased social spending will 
likely be in favour of (oppose) higher welfare expenditures and more progressive tax systems. 
Yet, attitudes toward redistribution are far from perfectly correlated with (current) income 
(Piketty, 1995); after all, “soaking the rich” has virtually been ruled out in capitalist 
democracies, if only for violently distorting work incentives and stalling economic growth.   
Indeed, demand for redistribution is found to be stronger amongst groups of the population 
that benefit most from income transfers and/or rely appreciably on welfare state provisions 
and programmes. Thus, old-age pensioners, the unemployed, and women are likelier to 
support income redistribution (and the welfare state, for that matter), the latter owing to their 
weaker labour market links as well as their more frequent than men’s employment in 
precarious jobs (see, for example, Owens and Pedulla, 2014; Svallfors, 1997). However, 
sometimes empirical findings seem to run counter to the self-interest explanation. In the US, 
for example, the elderly and African-Americans have significantly curtailed their 
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redistributive proclivity and there has been no significant divergence in trends in 
redistributive preferences between genders, whereas a modest increase in redistributive 
preferences has been observed amongst richer Americans (Ashok et al., 2015). 
At the aggregate level, it is suggested that there is a positive relationship between 
inequality and demand for redistribution; as inequality increases, thereby widening the 
distance between the average income and that of the median voter, demand for redistribution 
is increased too (Meltzer and Richard, 1981). However, empirical evidence in support of that 
relationship has been in short supply. Demand for redistribution has been generally 
impervious to rising income inequality in rich OECD countries (Kenworthy and McCall, 
2008), whereas in the US, despite a substantial increase in income inequality (Piketty and 
Saez, 2003; Autor, 2014), support for redistribution has slightly decreased since the 1970s 
(Kuziemko et al., 2015; Ashok et al., 2015). Being weak at the outset, the relationship 
between demand for redistribution and economic inequality is, nonetheless, found to vary 
across the various institutional configurations of the welfare state (Dallinger, 2010). Yet, the 
relationship between earnings inequality and welfare spending in OECD countries is very 
weak and even turns negative, depending on the category of welfare expenditures considered 
(Moene and Wallerstein, 2003).  
Given the empirical weakness of the standard rational-choice approach, theoretical 
explanations of redistributive preferences have been suggested, which incorporate the 
intertemporal dimension of utility maximization. Thus, a desire for social insurance against 
the risk of a (permanent) decline in income may imply increased demand for redistribution – 
more precisely, for redistributive insurance – when income rises (Moene and Wallerstein, 
2003). Furthermore, the prospect of upward mobility may curtail demand for redistribution, 
and may even cause opposition to higher tax rates amongst those whose current earnings fall 
below the average earnings, but who, nonetheless, take into consideration that they may move 
up the income scale and, hence, be liable to higher tax rates – this is the POUM (prospect of 
upward mobility) hypothesis (Benabu and Ok, 2001). Yet, the prospect of upward mobility 
and, even more importantly, the responsiveness of individual probabilities of moving up the 
income ladder to the individual effort (as opposed to luck) may not be anticipated completely 
– for lack of inexpensive information – implying, in turn, that the (adverse) effects of income 
redistribution on economic incentives may not be properly assessed. Thus, according to 
Piketty’s rational within-the-family learning theory, adult children may rationally embrace 
their parents’ redistributive preferences in full, including the parental family’s perception of 
the relative role of effort in causing income inequality (Piketty, 1995). Still, adult children 
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may adjust their preferences for redistribution, depending on their own experience of 
mobility and, consequently, on their perception of the importance of effort in determining 
individuals’ economic status. Hence, children who have experienced downward (upward) 
mobility and, therefore, are inclined to think that luck (effort) rather than effort (luck) 
determines individuals’ economic status, are more (less) likely to support income 
redistribution, their preferences also being stronger than children’s with no mobility 
experience (Siedler and Sonnenberg, 2012). 
Crucially, individual (and family for that matter) perceptions about the role of effort 
are intertwined with actual political outcomes, the causality running both ways. But, 
intertwined with actual political outcomes are, likewise, the psychologically-driven 
individual desires to believe in a “just world”, that is, a world where everyone gets what she 
deserves (Benabu and Tirole, 2006). Besides their self-evident causal link to political choices 
for redistribution, rationally learned individual attitudes, desired beliefs, and ideological 
predilections regarding the relative role of effort in causing income inequality and, therefore, 
individual preferences for redistribution may also be shaped by actual political choices. Thus, 
in more unequal and less redistributive polities, it is only rational for people to supply 
increased effort and, at the same time, to maintain and pass on to their children an optimistic 
world vision, while detesting a high degree of redistribution and a large welfare state 
(associated with high taxes). On the other hand, demand for redistribution will tend to be 
higher in less unequal and more redistributive polities, reflecting inter alia that effort is, 
rationally, relatively underrated (as opposed to luck) and pessimism prevails (as opposed to 
the belief that the world is just). This argument goes a long way towards explaining 
differences in welfare spending and income redistribution across countries, particularly 
between the United States and Europe (Alesina et al., 2018; Benabu and Tirole, 2006; 
Piketty, 1995), although other explanations have also been suggested, invoking historical 
differences in political institutions, cultural traditions or ethnic heterogeneity (for example, 
Alesina and Glaeser, 2004).       
Compared to the economists’ rationalistic accounting for values and (desired) beliefs 
regarding redistribution, the ideological explanation of individuals’ preferences, mostly 
espoused by political scientists, downplays the importance of (rational) economic motives, 
attaching, instead, increased weight to ideas and political attitudes (for example, Feldman and 
Zaller, 1992). Importantly, individual preferences for redistributive welfare spending are 
found to be aligned with personally-held ethical views, regarding, in particular, equality and 
freedom (Jacoby, 1994). Furthermore, the alignment of preferences for redistribution with left 
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and right political orientations is a well-established fact. Thus, in matters of taxation, 
empirical evidence suggests that, besides self-interest, preferences are strongly motivated by 
political ideas and that, at higher levels of direct taxation, preferences become heavily 
polarized along with political affinities (Jaime-Castillo and Sáez-Lozano, 2016). Increased 
polarization is interpreted, by the aforementioned researchers, as a manifestation of increased 
mobilization of both left-wing and right-wing voters to pursue their redistributive demands. 
Mobilization of low-income voters, in particular, is shown to push left-wing parties to the 
left, entailing inter alia a (more) vigorous defence of the redistributive welfare state 
(Pontusson and Rueda, 2010), thereby probably reinforcing mobilization of low-income as 
well as high-income voters.  
However, empirical (economic and politico-economic) research on the determinants 
of demand for income redistribution and on their relative importance in shaping real-world 
redistributive policies has often been confronted with a lack of appropriate data, mostly 
relying on aggregate data or field evidence. What is primarily at issue in the case of field 
evidence, though, is that subjective preferences for redistribution, as reported in social 
surveys, are founded on gross misperceptions of real-world inequality, more often than not 
presuming that income distribution is considerably more unequal than it is (Niehues, 2014). 
A large experimental literature has sprung, building on either laboratory or/and survey 
(social) experiments and focusing on, firstly, the motivation of demand for income 
redistribution, secondly, the individuals’ ethical dispositions and normative considerations 
regarding the social contract and, thirdly, the role of information in the formation and, 
especially, in the potential realignment of individual redistributive preferences.  
Thus, in a laboratory experiment with various “realistic” attributes regarding, for 
example, the information fed to subjects and the structure of decision making studied, self-
interest has emerged as the dominant motive of subjects’ redistributive preferences, although 
stated choices for redistributive taxation reflect, also, concerns for the poor and beliefs about 
fairness (Durante et al., 2014). Experimental research has tried to shed light on what appears 
to be an awkward coexistence of two phenomena, namely, a widespread popular concern 
about economic inequality, corroborated in laboratory research and associated with 
acknowledging the importance of equality as a social objective, and a preference for unequal 
distribution of economic resources revealed in behavioural studies and (other) laboratory 
experiments in search of individuals’ normative beliefs (Starmans et al., 2017). The answer to 
that paradox consists of experimental evidence suggesting that redistributive preferences 
reflect perceptions about the origins of inequality, thereby echoing the aforementioned 
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findings of economic research. Thus, if the determinants of inequality are perceived to be 
within the realm of individual control, redistributive preferences are watered down and 
market earnings are considered to be ethically justified (Cappelen et al., 2013). Furthermore, 
drawing on various laboratory studies and experiments with babies and young children, 
Starmans et al. (2014) argue that humans are naturally inclined to support fair distributions of 
economic resources, regardless of their implications for equality, and that when fairness and 
equality are mutually incompatible, people opt for fair inequality rather than unfair equality.       
Finally, the impact of an individual’s information about her position in the 
distribution of income on the demand for redistribution has been studied in various 
experimental studies.  Providing information on an individual’s actual social position, thereby 
correcting their income misperceptions, has been found to give rise to more unequal 
distributions amongst participants in (variously designed) laboratory experiments, reflecting 
the adjustment of participants’ preferences to self-interested utility maximization (for 
example, Kittel et al., 2017). On the other hand, evidence from online large sample survey 
experiments providing customized information on US income inequality and the tax-growth 
nexus shows that, whereas the respondents’ concern about income inequality is very sensitive 
to information, the effects of information on preferences over a bunch of redistributive 
policies are small and often insignificant, suggesting that redistributive preferences may be 
hard to change (Kuziemko et al., 2015). Moreover, when respondents are provided with 
information that corrects their previous overestimations regarding their economic positions, 
they tend to demand higher levels of redistribution (Cruces et al., 2013). Also, Bublitz 
(2016), in a comprehensive cross-national study found that in some countries correcting 
negative misperceptions through information provision slightly reduces the demand for 
redistribution. 
In this paper, we delve into the redistributive preferences of Greek university students. 
We ask whether their preferences across a range of redistributive policies are sensitive to 
information aiming at correcting their misperceptions. And if this is not the case, we proceed 
with asking whether the redistributive preferences of Greek students are primarily shaped by 
static and/or intertemporal utilitarian concerns or, on the contrary, are primarily, if not solely, 
determined by ideas and political attitudes. Therefore, our hypotheses may be summarised as 
follows: 
Ho: Provision of information has no relation to redistributive preferences. 
H1: Provision of information strengthens the utilitarian motivation of individual preferences 
for redistribution. 
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H2: Provision of information reinforces the ideological and political stances toward 
redistribution. 
And if Ho is not rejected: 
H3: Individual preferences for redistribution are primarily or solely motivated by self-interest, 
thereby reflecting imperfectly informed perceptions concerning own or family absolute and 
relative level of income.  
H4: Individual preferences for redistribution are primarily or solely shaped by imperfectly 
informed perceptions concerning personal economic prospects. 
H5: Individual preferences for redistribution are primarily or solely determined by values and 
ideas about equity and redistribution as well as political attitudes.  
 
3. CONCEPTUAL ISSUES AND RESEARCH DESIGN 
In this section, we discuss the conceptual and the technical, and empirical aspects of our 
research design, including the construction of the dependent and the independent variables.    
The dependent variable consists of students’ preferences for redistributive policies. Our 
questionnaire contained 13 redistributive policy actions, to which respondents had to answer 
on a 5-point scale that ranged from “totally agree” to “totally disagree”. To reduce the 
number of variables and locate possible latent variables, we conduct principal components 
analysis (PCA), for which our data proves suitable. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin (KMO) measure 
of sampling adequacy is .846, above the value of .6, which is usually recommended in the 
literature, and Bartlett’s test of sphericity is statistically significant (χ2 (78) = 1430.91, p < 
.05). The PCA returns four components, with all communalities being above .3 (Table 1).  
The first component comprises six variables, each indicating the level of agreement 
with one of the following six policy actions, respectively: strengthening of protection against 
dismissals, an increase in the minimum wage, an increase in employers’ contributions for 
social security, an increase in public expenditure for the elderly (mainly pensions), an 
increase in the rate of tax levied on high incomes, and an increase in public expenditure for 
unemployment benefits. The first component has an initial eigenvalue of 4.04 and accounts 
for 31.1% of the total variance. The other three components account for less than 10% of 
variance each, two of them comprising two variables and one comprising three. Hence, when 
it comes to the specification of our composite dependent variable, the first component is the 
statistically dominant choice: it is way ahead of the other components in that it accounts for a 
far larger percentage of the total variance. Besides, the choice of the first component accords 
well with theory and factual evidence; and it consequently passes the test of (internal) 
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coherence, with a Cronbach’s a of .756, exceeding the .7 value which is commonly thought to 
demarcate internally consistent composite variables from inconsistent ones. 
Thus, each of the six constituent variables of the first component and the policy action 
referred to therein has concrete redistributive content; and solicited preferences for 
redistribution across the range of policy actions captured by the six constituent variables are 
plausibly maintained. However, empirical evidence, particularly for Greece, on the expected 
redistributive effects of the six policy actions contained in the first component has been in 
short supply. For example, there is scant empirical evidence on the redistributive effects of 
employment protection legislation or the effects of increased expenditure on income support 
for the unemployed. Yet, one may hardly dispute their redistributive potential – still, of 
unknown size – or, for that matter, their appeal amongst those supporting redistribution. On 
the other hand, the impact of the minimum wage on poverty and income inequality is found 
to be negative (poverty and inequality are lowered), though negligible in size, despite – or, 
because of – lack of conclusive evidence on the (dis)employment effects of the minimum 
wage (for example, Fotoniata and Moutos, 2009; Karageorgiou, 2004; Karakitsios, 2018). 
Furthermore, contrary to the predictions of standard economic theory, the incidence of 
employers’ social contributions on gross wage earnings is found to be averted, thereby 
allowing for the realization of redistributive effects (Saez et al., 2012). On the other hand, 
whereas the redistributive impact of public spending on pensions is widely acknowledged, it 
falls short of remedying poverty amongst the elderly, owing to the very low level of 
minimum pensions and a large number of people in noncontributory schemes (Petmesidou 
and Glatzer, 2015). Therefore, the redistributive effects of increased spending on pensions 
largely depend upon their allocation in favour of those at the low end of the pension scale.       
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Table 1: Principal components analysis (PCA): Preferences for redistributive policies (DV)1 
Totally agree- Totally disagree  
Components 
Communalities 
1 2 3 4 
Strengthening of protection against 
dismissals 
.741 .015 .183 -.029 .583 
Increase in the minimum wage .660 .193 .210 -.163 .543 
Increase in employers’ contributions for 
social security 
.659 .136 .037 .191 .491 
Increase in public expenditure for the elderly 
(mainly pensions) 
.576 .439 -.159 -.203 .590 
Increase in rates of taxation levied on high 
incomes 
.534 .200 .070 .425 .511 
Increase in public expenditure for 
unemployment benefits 
.525 .340 .256 .135 .475 
Increase in public expenditure for education .140 .792 .080 .037 .655 
Increase in public expenditure for health 
services 
.285 .758 .088 -.021 .664 
Increase in public expenditure for family 
protection 
.031 .676 .207 .105 .512 
Establishment of guaranteed minimum 
income, with income criteria and on the 
precondition of active employment seeking 
.047 .206 .823 .084 .728 
Establishment of basic income .316 .097 .722 -.100 .641 
Increase in property tax -.080 .037 -.089 .844 .727 
Increase in “solidarity tax”, paid for by high 
incomes  
.455 -.003 .217 .467 .472 
Initial eigenvalues 4.043 1.281 1.189 1.089  
% of variance 31.1 9.9 9.1 8.4  
 
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
Our main independent variable is the provision of information through experimental 
video treatments; we discuss the forms later. In addition to the experimental treatments, we 
measure our respondents’ views on fairness, equality, and the welfare state through a battery 
                                                          
1 A correlation matrix of redistribution preferences can be found in the Appendix. 
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of 15 theory-informed questions. The answers to these questions are also reduced to four 
variables through PCA. The four components were ‘‘Social Investment Welfare State’’, 
‘‘Egalitarian welfare state’’, ‘‘Fairness, not equality’’, and ‘‘Equality as fairness’’ 
(KMO=.825, Bartlett’s test of sphericity [χ2 (105) = 1859.56, p < .05]). Notably, the 
emerging clustering accords almost fully with the insights of the economic theory of labour 
markets and social policy (e.g. Boeri and van Ours, 2013), as well as political sociology and 
comparative politics, including typologies of the welfare state (e.g. Esping-Andersen, 1990; 
Hemmerijck, 2017), the only exception being the classification of the better targeting 
provision in the ‘‘egalitarian welfare state’’ composite variable, along with the universal 
welfare state provision. The components, the variables that constitute them, their factor 
loadings, their exponents’ signs, and communalities are presented in Table 2. A variety of 
other variables are also measured: gender, age, years of study, political interest, political 
participation, self-placement on the Left-Right axis, objective economic position, the 
respondents’ income misperceptions, and their perceived personal economic prospects. 
Regarding the latter, the reason we rely on perceptions of economic prospects, instead of 
mobility expectations per se, is the lack of reliable objective data on social mobility, thus 
hardly allowing for proper evaluation (and measurement) of individual mobility prospects. 
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A fair society ensures equality of opportunities 
for its members 
.713 .026 -.110 .045 .522 
A fair society protects its members from poverty 
and deprivation 
.689 .214 .128 -.145 .558 
A fair society should guarantee that all its 
members satisfy their basic needs 
.581 .141 .158 -.088 .390 
The appropriate policy includes supporting the 
standard of living of the unemployed  
.581 .183 .384 -.080 .524 
The appropriate policy includes the improvement 
of employment prospects for the unemployed 
.514 .066 .433 .171 .486 
In a fair society, extreme economic inequalities 
(in income and wealth) must be limited 
.139 .830 .097 -.102 .728 
In a fair society economic inequalities (in 
income and wealth) must be limited 
.207 .816 .089 -.215 .763 
Economic inequalities (in income and wealth) 
harm democracy 
.110 .640 .203 -.329 .571 
The appropriate policy consists in strengthening  
labour market regulation in order to protect jobs 
.027 .239 .733 .079 .601 
The appropriate policy consists in strengthening 
labour market regulation in order to increase the 
take-home pay of the lower paid 
.159 .247 .707 -.135 .604 
The appropriate policy consists in strengthening 
the universal welfare state, funded by high 
taxation 
.086 -.045 .579 -.228 .397 
The appropriate policy consists in better 
targeting provisions to the benefit of the poor 
.445 -.070 .503 -.017 .457 
Economic inequalities (in income and wealth) 
are acceptable when they do not hamper social 
mobility prospects 
-.029 -.115 -.088 .827 .705 
Economic inequalities (in income and wealth) 
are morally acceptable when they reflect 
-.034 -.148 -.084 .810 .686 




Economic inequalities (in income and wealth) 
are an unavoidable consequence of a dynamic 
economy 
-.042 -.326 -.007 .544 .405 
Initial eigenvalues 4.222 1.999 1.160 1.016  
% of variance 28.1 13.3 7.7 6.8  
Extraction Method: Principal Component Analysis. Rotation Method: Varimax with Kaiser Normalization. 
 
Our respondents’ perceptions divergence from reality is operationalized by way of 
subtracting their actual economic position on a 10-point scale based on the reported income 
in Euros2 from a subjective economic position on a 10-point scale3. If a respondent had an 
absolute difference between the two measures of more than one standard deviation, then they 
were considered as misperceiving their position (by having either a higher or a lower 
perception than their actual position). If the difference was within the boundaries of one 




Our research design is divided into two parts and is ‘‘endogenous’’ in nature. We 
characterize it as endogenous because what happened in the first part would define what 
would happen in the second part or if we proceeded to the second part at all. The first part 
aims at testing whether the provision of relevant information affects preferences for 
redistributive policies, either by altering them towards more utilitarian positions (Hypothesis 
1) or by reinforcing their ideological drive (Hypothesis 2). If information provision did not 
play a statistically significant role, then the second part of our design would be initiated, to 
identify whether preferences are motivated by self-interest (Hypothesis 3), intertemporal 
utility considerations (Hypothesis 4), or are, instead, driven by ideology and political 
attitudes (Hypothesis 5). We should state at the outset that both parts of our research design 
were carried out because the provision of information did not affect preferences.   
                                                          
2 Respondents were asked to report their income in Euros (family income if they were unemployed or had part-
time jobs, personal income if they had full-time jobs) and were assigned to deciles according to official data 
from the Hellenic Statistical Authority. 
3 Question wording: “If this ladder represents different income levels in Greek society, in which step of the 
ladder would you place yourself, if 1 represents the lowest and 10 represents the highest income level?” 
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The first part of our research design falls under the category of a post-test only control 
group experimental design, which abides by the most important prerequisite of such a design, 
namely the random assignment of respondents to different groups. Had it not have 
randomization of participants, it would resemble more to a static group comparison 
(Campbell 1957, p. 304). In terms of its treatments, it is a pre-decisional manipulation design 
because the information stimuli are inserted before the dependent variable, to test whether 
they affect it or not (Sniderman and Grob, 1996). The first known application of this kind of 
design, to which our research bears a considerable resemblance, was Gosnell’s famous 
experiment, more than ninety years ago, about what motivates people to vote, where he 
randomly divided voters of Chicago into two groups, provided the members of only one 
group with information stimuli and wanted to test whether this information would affect the 
turnout rate (1926). A great bulk of research has since been developed along those lines.  
Our research was conducted on 533 Greek university students of all levels 
(undergraduate, graduate, and doctoral candidates) of three Universities in the Greater Athens 
area, namely the National and Kapodistrian University of Athens, the Agricultural University 
of Athens, and Harokopeio University. Participation was voluntary and we provided no 
incentives for it. We employed convenience sampling. It is well known that one of the 
disadvantages of convenience sampling is the lack of control over initial differences between 
experimental and control groups, possibly resulting in issues of validity and distortion of 
results due to outlying cases (Farrokhi and Mahmoudi-Hamidabad, 2012). However, 
convenience sampling is widely used for experimental designs and it has been shown that it is 
a reliable technique that can even yield results similar to probability sampling (Mullinix et al., 
2015), making it suitable for survey purposes as well. In any case, generalization claims to a 
wider research population constitute a marginal aim of the present study. The study was 
conducted in computer laboratories of the three universities between October 2016 and May 
2017, in groups of ten to twenty students. The questionnaire and the data collection were 
administered through the Qualtrics platform and instructions were given to respondents live 
by three research assistants.  
The respondents were randomly assigned to three different groups, each of which was 
administered a different treatment. At a certain point of the online questionnaire, respondents 
were asked to click a link to a private YouTube video. The members of the first group were 
shown an 11-minute video, describing the economic situation in Greece, presenting data 
about economic inequalities and the policies to tackle them, as well as some comparative 
information about other European countries. The members of the second group were shown a 
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16-minute video, which contained data enabling them to figure out their relative position and 
economic prospects, in addition to the information contained in the first video treatment (for 
a detailed list of the information shown in the video treatments see Appendix). Finally, the 
members of the third group (the control group) were shown a video just thanking them and 
asking them to return to complete the rest of the questionnaire. In terms of treatment logic, 
our research design bears resemblance to Stoker’s research on affirmative action, where she 
administered three different information treatments (or ‘‘conditions’’) to respective groups: a 
baseline condition, a representation condition, and a discrimination condition (Stoker, 1995). 
Accordingly, our treatments could be characterized as a control condition, a contextual 
condition, and a comparative condition. In sum, our respondents answered the same set of 
questions up to the point where they were randomly assigned to the three groups and shown a 
different video treatment. After watching the treatment, they returned to the questionnaire and 
they all answered the same questions about our dependent variable. 
To test whether information provision affects preferences for redistribution, we 
employ an analysis of covariance (ANCOVA). ANCOVA controls for the effects of 
variables’ differences between groups, ensuring between-group similarity after respondents’ 
random assignment to the three different groups (Tabachnick and Fidell, 2013, p. 52). To run 
ANCOVA we also need to make sure that the error variance between the three groups is not 
statistically significant. Indeed, Levene’s test of equality of error variances returns a p-value 
of .260, confirming that the error differences between the three groups are not statistically 
significant and that we can proceed with the ANCOVA. In other words, we try to identify 
differences in redistributive preferences between the three different groups, while at the same 
time controlling for several variables, to ensure maximum between-group similarity. The 
results of the ANCOVA, which indicate that information provision (‘‘Video treatment’’) does 
not affect preferences for redistributive policies, are presented in Table 3. 
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Table 3: Analysis of Covariance (ANCOVA): The no effect of correcting for income 
misperceptions 
Tests of Between-Subjects Effects  
Dependent Variable:   Preferences for redistributive policies    
Source  
Type III Sum 
of Squares df Mean Square F Sig. 
Partial Eta 
Squared 
Corrected Model  2346.470a 15 156.431 15.976 .000 .487 
Intercept  662.404 1 662.404 67.652 .000 .212 
L-R self-placement  4.546 1 4.546 .464 .496 .002 
Political interest  32.493 1 32.493 3.319 .070 .013 
Age  4.588 1 4.588 .469 .494 .002 
Income misperceptions  11.959 1 11.959 1.221 .270 .005 
Years of study  4.585 1 4.585 .468 .494 .002 
Political participation  1.812 1 1.812 .185 .667 .001 
Personal economic 
situation  
8.050 1 8.050 .822 .365 .003 
Social investment welfare 
state  
290.835 1 290.835 29.703 .000 .105 
Equality as fairness  304.588 1 304.588 31.108 .000 .110 
Egalitarian Welfare State  914.701 1 914.701 93.419 .000 .270 
Fairness, not equality  189.832 1 189.832 19.388 .000 .071 
Gender  156.988 1 156.988 16.033 .000 .060 
Perceptions on economic 
prospects next 12 months 
4.375 
 
4.375 .447 .504 .002 
Video Treatment 12.761 2 6.380 .409 .522 .005 
Error  2758.804 252 9.791 
   
Total  47619.000 268 
    
Corrected Total  4813.892 267 
    
a. R Squared = .487 (Adjusted R Squared = .457)  
 
It becomes apparent from Table 3 that correcting misperceptions has no effect on 
redistributive preferences. Since preferences for redistributive policies are not associated with 
the information fed to our respondents, the null hypothesis is not rejected and, hence, the 
alternative hypotheses 1 and 2 are not accepted. Accordingly, we are then entitled to treating 
our sample as a unified whole and, to test Hypotheses 3, 4, and 5, initiate the second part of 
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our research design, which effectively is a cross-sectional survey with a convenient sample of 
Greek students. In other words, in the second part of our research design, our goal is to 
identify other possible causal mechanisms that explain the formation of preferences for 
redistributive policies. As will be thoroughly presented in the next part of the paper, we first 
identify different attitudes towards redistribution for our whole sample, and then we perform 
discriminant analysis to locate the processes that could account for these differences.  
 
4. (FURTHER) RESEARCH FINDINGS AND DISCUSSION 
The fact that the provision of information does not affect redistributive preferences, as was 
presented in the previous section, is the first finding of our research. In the present section, 
we will proceed to the presentation and analysis of the findings of our total sample. Firstly, a 
brief description of our sample in comparison to the general population is necessary. Our 
respondents are 59% female and 41% male (51% and 49% respectively in the general 
population); their average age is 25 years, while the average age of the Greek adult general 
population is 49 years4. In terms of their level of study, 76% are undergraduates, 21% 
postgraduates, and 3% doctoral students. Concerning their political predisposition, their mean 
self-placement is 4.41 on the 11-point Left-Right scale, where 0 is the utmost left point and 
10 is the utmost right point (5.44 in the general population5). Finally, our respondents’ vote 
on the notorious July 2015 referendum in Greece was quite representative of the actual 
results, since 64.2% reported that they voted ‘‘No’’ and 35.8% ‘‘Yes’’6. 
Regarding our dependent variable, we recode the previously mentioned composite 
scale into three categories. The first category, ‘‘Support for redistribution’’ comprises 
respondents who agree/rather agree with all six questions on redistributive policies (see the 
previous section). Respondents who agree with more variables than they disagree with, that 
is, they disagree or express no opinion to less than 3 of these questions, are assigned to the 
second category, called ‘‘Cherry-picking’’. All the rest, that is, those who disagree with most 
or all the questions, are classified to the ‘‘Opposition to redistribution’’ category. The 
absolute majority of our young in age, left-leaning, student sample proved to be supportive of 
                                                          
4 Source of all demographic data:  Hellenic Statistical Authority (www.statistics.gr). 
5 Prorata, December 2016. 
6 From January until June 2015, Greece had engaged in prolonged negotiations with its creditors (European 
Commission, European Central Bank and International Monetary Fund). In late June 2015, Greece, facing 
immediate default, was proposed a harsh austerity and structural reforms package in exchange for a new bail-out 
loan agreement. The Greek government then proclaimed a referendum to be held only eight days later, on July 
the 5th, with the Greek electorate rejecting the proposed agreement, with 61.3%. Nevertheless, the Greek 
government, which also opposed the proposed agreement, agreed to a similar one, a mere week later. 
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redistribution (53.2%). Almost one in five of our respondents (18.7%) are cherry pickers, 
while 28.1% oppose redistribution (Table 4). It is interesting that 59.9% of female 
respondents support redistribution, as do only 43.6% of male respondents (χ2 (2, N = 513) = 
21.364, p = 0.000) (not shown). The reason for this gender difference must be the fact that the 
females in our sample are significantly more left-leaning, with a mean score of 4.13 on the 
Left-Right 11-point scale than male respondents (mean score of 4.80). When we control for 
ideological self-placement, the association between gender and redistributive preferences 
ceases to exist. Unsurprisingly, those who support redistribution are self-positioned towards 
the Left (mean score of 3.77), those who express a cautious stance are positioned at the center 
(4.98), while those who oppose redistribution are positioned slightly right-of-centre, with a 
mean score of 5.33, in statistically significant differences ([F(2, 470)=32.858, p=0.000)]. 
Correspondingly, 76.2% of redistribution supporters voted “No” to the July 2015 referendum, 
as did 59.3% of those who are cautious towards redistribution and only 44.9% of those who 
oppose redistribution. Among the latter, the absolute majority (55.1%) voted “Yes” to the 
referendum ((χ2 (2, N = 3687) = 30.831, p = 0.000) (all the findings of this paragraph are not 
shown). No statistically significant relationships are detected between redistributive 
preferences and other variables, like age, income, perceived economic position, year of study, 
occupation, and perceptions on economic prospects.  
Of great interest is the match of our respondents’ perceptions to reality: 52.3% have 
no or small misperceptions, 44.5% perceive themselves as worse-off than they are, something 
that is expected in times of economic crisis, while only 3.2% think that they are in a better 
economic position than they are. In Table 4, the association between preferences for 
redistributive policies and respondents’ misperceptions is presented. No or limited 
misperceptions are linked to less support for redistributive policies, in a statistically 
significant way. Of those who demonstrate a good match between their perceived and their 
actual economic position, 46.4% support redistribution, 21.5% cherry-pick redistribution 
policies and 32.1% oppose redistribution (Table 4). It is among those latter that both 
opposition to redistribution and caution towards redistribution are at their highest. On the 
contrary, support for redistribution exceeds 60% among those who misperceive their 
economic position, either believing that they are worse-off (support for redistribution: 60.3%) 
or better-off (62.5%) than they are. At the same time, both opposition to redistribution and 
cherry-picking of redistributive policies are at their lowest among those less well-informed. 
                                                          
7 Respondents who casted a valid ballot at the referendum. The rest voted blank, invalids, did not vote, did not 
remember or refused to answer. 









No or limited 
misperceptions 












of the total 
sample) 





46.4% 60.3% 62.5% 53.2% 
Cherry-picking  21.5% 15.9% 12.5% 18.7% 
Opposition to 
redistribution  
32.1% 23.7% 25.0% 28.1% 
Total  100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 100.0% 
χ2 (4, N = 513) = 10.305, p = 0.036 
 
After outlining the profile of respondents who support redistribution and establishing 
the statistically significant association between preferences for redistribution and income 
misperceptions, a more comprehensive approach, which entails the testing of a potential 
causal mechanism, is in order. In other words, it is now necessary to test our third, fourth, and 
fifth hypotheses, which suggest that, since the provision of information does not matter, self –
interest, perceptions regarding personal economic prospects, income misperceptions, and 
political predispositions, along with views on fairness, equality and the welfare state may 
affect preferences for redistributive policies of young Greeks. To test these hypotheses we 
carry out the discriminant analysis. Discriminant analysis can determine the optimal 
combination of independent variables (i.e. ‘‘functions’’), which explains why respondents are 
allocated to the three different categories of our dependent variable. 
The discriminant analysis produced two statistically significant functions. The overall 
predictive accuracy of our model is represented by a hit ratio of 63.0% while the highest prior 
probability was 54.2% and the probability of by chance discriminating group membership 
was 33.3%. That signifies an almost 30% difference between the classification ability of our 
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model and maximum by chance classification when the commonly agreed threshold is 25%. 
Hence, our model is accepted.  
More specifically, our data is projected onto two different dimensions that best 
discriminate respondents between the three categories of our dependent variable. Five 
variables demonstrate a higher correlation with the first function: placement on the Left-Right 
scale and the prior views on the four notions of equality and welfare state that were 
previously presented. This function, which may be called the ‘‘ideological/political 
orientation dimension’’, accounts for 82.7% of the total variance in our dependent variable. 
The other function also comprises five variables, namely political participation, interest in 
politics, objective economic position, perceptions on economic prospects next 12 months, and 
income misperceptions, has a discriminating ability of 17.3% and embodies a ‘‘political 
activism, economic self-awareness and self-interest’’ dimension (Table 5).  
 
Table 5: Discriminant Analysis: Structure matrix8 
 Function 
1 2 
L-R self-placement .560* .083 
Egalitarian Welfare State  .515* .423 
Fairness, not equality  -.407* .046 
Equality as fairness  .382* -.114 
Social Investment Welfare State  .320* .172 
Interest in politics* -.001 .668* 
Political participation# -.405 -.437* 
Income misperceptions -.135 -.399* 
Personal economic situation .019 .223* 
Perceptions on economic prospects next 12 months .001 -.185* 
Pooled within-groups correlations between discriminating variables and standardized canonical discriminant functions.  
Variables ordered by absolute size of correlation within function.  
*Coding: 1-4, 1=Very interested.  
#Coding: 0-9, how many of the following activities they have participated in or it is possible that they would: membership in a 
political organization/party, petition, boycott, legal demonstration, protest, legal strike, illegal strike, occupation of a public 
building, destruction of public property. 
                                                          
8
 A table of descriptives of variables entered in the Discriminant analysis, as well as a table containing the 
Standardized Canonical Discriminant Function Coefficients, can be found in the Appendix. 
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In Figure 1, functions in group centroids are presented. Group centroids represent the 
mean score for each dependent-variable group of respondents on the respective function or 
dimension. What is of greater interest in dealing with group centroids is their relative position 
on each dimension. On the ‘‘ideological/political orientation dimension’’, which has the 
greatest discriminating ability, it is evident that the three groups of our dependent variable are 
ordered in a fashion that by and large corresponds to a classic redistributional Left-Right axis, 
with those who support redistribution being at the opposite extreme from those who oppose 
it, while cherry pickers are positioned in the space between them (Figure 1). In essence, this 
finding corroborates our fifth hypothesis, about the role of prior beliefs and political attitudes 
in the formation of redistributive preferences.  
 
Figure 1: Discriminant Analysis: Functions at Group Centroids 
 
The ideological/political orientation dimension  
Function 1: Canonical correlation: 0.52 / 82.7% of variance 





The political activism, economic self-awareness and self-interest dimension 
Function 2: Canonical correlation: 0.27 / 17.3% of variance 





On the political activism, economic self-awareness, and self-interest dimension, the 
group of respondents who oppose redistribution are placed at the one end, but the group 
closest to them is the group comprising those who support redistribution. Those who have a 
cherry-picking stance on redistributive policies are positioned rather far away, at the other 
end of this dimension (Figure 1). Taking into account the direction of loadings of each 
variable to each function and the way those variables were coded (Table 5), it can be asserted 
that those who hold relatively firmer views on redistribution – those who are more partisan – 
are likelier to engage in politics and more pessimistic regarding their economic future, whilst 
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also being relatively less well off but maintaining inaccurate perceptions of their true 
economic position (Figure 1). On the other hand, it seems that the ‘‘cherry-picking’’ end of 
this dimension is characterized by limited or no misperceptions regarding the personal 
economic position of respondents, less active political participation, lower levels of political 
interest, economic optimism, and a higher position in the actual income ladder. The fact that 
those who are disengaged politically and more self-aware economically are more cautious in 
terms of their redistributive preferences, might reflect, to some extent, their increased 
awareness of the workings of Greek social policy (and its questionable legacy), which leads 
them to more moderate positions. Additionally, the finding that cherry-picking of 
redistributive policies is preferred by the relatively better off and/or those with optimistic 
expectations regarding their future, might mean that the less threatened one feels the more 
they are willing to engage in some kind of calculation and rationalization regarding 
redistributive policies. On the other hand, a lower place in the actual income ladder combined 
with a perception for further deterioration leads to resorting to firmer positions either for or 
against redistribution. In a nutshell, insecurity makes for partisanship. Thus, regarding the 
role of self-interest and of perceptions of personal economic prospects which pertain to our 
third and fourth hypotheses, it can be asserted that they do not directly shape preferences but 
they rather have an auxiliary or reinforcing role. In sum, the first dimension which 
discriminates our respondents’ preferences for redistributive policies seems to be about the 
content of redistribution and the second about its intensity.  
 
5. CONCLUSIONS 
Given the lack of (sufficient) policy adjustment to widening economic inequalities, survey 
and experimental research on subjective preferences for redistribution has been seeking to 
provide an answer, focusing on the determinants of redistributive preferences. This paper 
adds to the literature via studying the preferences of young persons, in particular Greek 
university students, that is, a group of the population whose redistributive preferences have, 
thus far, received scant attention. A further innovative feature of this paper is that preferences 
for redistribution are treated in a disaggregated fashion; thus, preferences are specified across 
a broad range of redistributive policies (and welfare state) institutions.  
Thus, we hypothesized that the provision of objective information would (a) either 
strengthen the utilitarian motivation of individual redistributive preferences or (b) reinforce 
existing ideological stances towards redistribution. If no association existed between 
information provision and redistributive preferences, we hypothesized that redistributive 
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preferences would be affected by (c) self-interest, (d) perceptions on personal economic 
prospects, and (e) political attitudes and prior values and ideas about equity and 
redistribution.  
Our research design, therefore, had an endogenous nature, in the sense that the conduction of 
the second part was dependent upon the results of the first part. The first part was a post-test 
only control group experimental design, where we tested the effects of information provision, 
in the form of two different experimental treatments. Since an association was not 
established, the second part of our design was implemented, in the form of a regular cross-
sectional survey, where we treated our sample as a whole. To test the first couple of 
hypotheses, we implemented analysis of covariance, as an additional way to ensure between-
group similarity, besides random assignment of respondents to groups. The method of 
analysis for the testing of the three other hypotheses, of the second part of our research 
design, was discriminant analysis. Our dependent variable had three categories: support for 
redistribution, opposition to redistribution, and cherry-picking of redistributive policies. 
In summary, our findings suggest that the provision of objective information has 
virtually no effect on subjective preferences for redistribution, thus echoing the findings of 
recent social experimental research. Besides, the discriminant analysis identified two 
dimensions on which redistributive preferences are formed: an ideological dimension and 
political activism, economic self-awareness, and self-interest dimension. Redistributive 
preferences are found to primarily reflect individual social values, ideological beliefs, and 
political engagement; utilitarian motives are found to merely reinforce ideology-driven 
preferences for redistribution. Relative ignorance of one’s position in the actual distribution 
of income, as well as feelings of economic insecurity, are found to intensify preferences for 
redistribution, both in support for and against redistributive policies.  
Further research on subjective redistributive preferences is certainly required. A 
promising way forward may likely entail research on the preferences of certain social groups, 
particularly those with a weak connection to the labour market, such as the unemployed and 
those employed in rather precarious jobs. Moreover, examining redistributive preferences in a 
comparative perspective and introducing complementary research methods, like the 
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Table A1 Contents of experimental treatments 
Information provided Treatment 
Income distribution in Greece 2014 (in deciles and quartiles) A+B 
Income inequalities in Greece 2005-2014 (how many times is the income of the 
richest 20% bigger than the income of the poorest 20%). Data tabulated by age-
group: up to 65 years old, more than 65 years old. 
A+B 
Property worth distribution in Greece 2012, in deciles. A+B 
Poverty line, Greece, 2005-2014 (measured as 60% of the median income). 
Presented both for an individual and for a family with two adults and two 
children. 
A+B 
Percentage of people in poverty, 2008 & 2014 (people having income below the 
poverty line). 
A+B 
Percentage of short-term (less than 1 year) unemployed people who receive 
benefits, 2010 & 2013, in Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Germany. 
A+B 
Percentage of long-term (more than 1 year) unemployed people who receive 
benefits, 2010 & 2013, in Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Germany. 
A+B 
Public spending in social protection as GDP percentage, 2012, in Greece, 
Bulgaria, Ireland, France, Spain and Portugal. 
A+B 
Minimum wage (in Euros), 2008, 2014, 2015, 2008-2015 change, in Greece, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, France, United Kingdom, Ireland, Spain, Holland and 
Portugal. 
A+B 
Income tax rates with an example for a €30,000 annual income. A+B 
Solidarity tax rates. A+B 
Property tax rate, along with calculation example. A+B 
Social class classification presentation, according to occupation and education. B only 
Probabilities of social mobility in Greece, according to parents’ social class. B only 
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